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Il est possible d’interpréter une classe d’indices d’iniquité horizontale
comme représentant un regroupement de moyennes normatives de sentiments
individuels de performance relative dans la distribution des taxes et des
transferts. Un membre très connu de cette classe est l’indice d’iniquité
horizontale d’Atkinson et de Plotnick. On peut interpréter de façon similaire des
indices généralisés de Gini comme étant des moyennes normatives de sentiments
individuels de privation relative. La combinaison de ces deux classes d’indices
peut nous permettre de mieux soupeser les objectifs concurrents de réduction
d’inégalité et d’équité horizontale. Les résultats portant sur l’équité horizontale
sont illustrés à l’aide de la distribution des taxes et des transferts au Canada en
1981 et en 1990. Nous trouvons que les sentiments de mauvaise performance
relative ainsi que l’iniquité horizontale ont augmenté de façon statistiquement
significative dans les années 1980.
Mots clés: Équité horizontale, inégalité, bien-être social
Abstract
A class of horizontal inequity indices is interpreted as an ethically
sensitive function of individual feelings of relative performance in the tax and
benefit allocation. A well-known member of that class is the Atkinson-Plotnick
index of horizontal inequity. Generalised Gini coefficients are analogously found
to be ethically sensitive functions of individual feelings of relative deprivation.
Combining these two classes can provide an ethically sensitive basis for
weighing the twin objectives of inequality reduction and horizontal equity. We
illustrate the horizontal inequity results using the 1981 and 1990 Canadian
distributions of taxes and benefits, and find that relative ill-performance feelings
and horizontal inequity have witnessed a statistically significant increase in the
1980’s.
JEL Numbers: H23, I30
Keywords: Horizontal inequity, inequality, social welfareI. Introduction
The principle of horizontal equity generally requires that individuals in
identical relevant circumstances should be treated identically by the state and
should therefore face identical tax and benefit schedules
1. This classical
requirement also implies that the tax and benefit schedule should not alter the
initial rank order of individuals in the distribution of welfare. Because of the
empirical rarity of observing exact equals in the initial distributions of incomes
or welfare, a number of applied studies have focussed on "reranking" approaches
to determine the extent of horizontal inequity operated by various tax and benefit
systems
2. A popular tool for the measurement of reranking and the computation
of indices of horizontal inequity has been the comparison of Lorenz and
concentration curves for the distribution of economic well-being, the concentra-
tion curve being computed on the basis of the pre-tax and pre-benefit ranking of
individuals
3. Very similar indices also serve to decompose the Gini coefficient
(and Generalised Gini coefficients) into between-groups and within-groups
contributions, by showing the intensity of group overlapping
4.
This paper interprets these indices of reranking and horizontal inequity
as aggregates of individual feelings of relative performance in the allocation of
taxes and benefits. Suppose that the movement from a gross (i.e., pre-tax and
benefit) income distribution to a net (post-tax and benefit) income distribution
involves a reranking of individuals in the dimension of their incomes. Let
1 See, for instance, Musgrave (1959) and Simons (1950).
2 For discussions and comparisons of the classical and reranking approaches,
see, inter alia, Feldstein (1976), Atkinson (1979), Plotnick (1982), Jenkins
(1988), Musgrave (1990), Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994), Lambert and
Ramos (1995), and Kakwani and Lambert (1995).
3 This is done, for instance, in Atkinson (1979), Plotnick (1981), Kakwani
(1984), Duclos (1993), and Palme (1994).
4 See Mooklerjee and Shorrocks (1982), Silber (1989), and Lambert and
Aronson (1993).
1individuals assess their relative ill-performance in the tax and benefit reranking
as the sum of the incomes of those by whom they have been overpassed minus
the sum of the incomes of those individuals they succeed in overpassing. The
average feeling of ill-performance over the population can then be interpreted as
an index of horizontal inequity since a horizontally equitable redistribution must
not alter the rank order of individuals. We show in Section II that this index of
horizontal inequity is the one proposed by Atkinson (1979) and Plotnick (1981),
an index which equals twice the area between the familiar Lorenz and concentra-
tion curves for net incomes.
Following
5 Hey and Lambert (1980), it is also possible to define an
individual feeling of deprivation as the difference between the individual’s
income and the income of richer individuals in the income distribution.
Computing the mean feeling of deprivation over the population, we confirm that
it is equal to the well-known Gini coefficient of inequality. We generalise this
exercise in Section III by applying ethically sensitive weights to individual
feelings of deprivation. This leads to the generalised Gini indices of inequality
proposed in Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and in Yitzhaki (1983).
Applying the same general class of weights onto individual feelings of
relative ill-performance, we find in Section IV a class of ethically sensitive
indices of horizontal inequity. This is in the spirit of Plotnick’s (1981)
observation that any "inequity measure would embody a weighting scheme, the
validity of which would also depend ultimately upon a normative judgement"
(p.285). Our analysis expresses this normative dependence as an explicit function
of individual feelings of ill-performance. Because such individual feelings give
ethical status to the pre-tax distribution, they can contribute to the definition of
a social welfare ordering in a manner analogous to that, for instance, of King
(1983) and Chakravarty (1985), where both inequality reduction and the
minimisation of horizontal inequities feature in the social welfare objectives of
the state. Using the 1981 and 1990 Canadian distributions of taxes and benefits,
5 See also Yitzhaki (1979).
2we compute in Section V the average feelings of relative ill-performance at
different points of the Canadian income distribution. Using recent developments
in the application of statistical inference to Lorenz and concentration curves, we
find that these feelings of relative ill-performance and the associated indices of
horizontal inequity underwent a statistically significant increase in the 1980’s.
Section VI concludes.
II. Relative Performance and Horizontal Inequity
Let X be gross income and let N(X) be the associated level of net
income that is given by the state’s allocation of taxes and benefits. N(X) is thus
a mapping of the gross income distribution onto a net income distribution
6.W e
assume that these incomes can range from 0 to infinity, and have a finite mean




-1(q) their inverse distribution functions. Define
G(q) as




G(q) is the function that gives the initial rank p in the gross income distribution
of someone whose rank in the net income distribution is q.






td F X (t) , with p FX(y)
6 For an explicit definition of the transition from a continuous income
distribution to another, see Kanbur and Stromberg (1988).
7 The assumption of continuous distributions in the main text is made for
expositional ease. The corresponding and analogous results for the case of
discrete distributions are derived in the appendix. Our examples in the text will
also sometimes assume a discrete income distribution with a total of H
individuals.
3where µX is the mean of FX.L X(p) shows the proportion of total income held by
those individuals with rank p or less in the distribution FX. Define in an
analogous way the Lorenz curve for FN as LN(q). We refer to the concentration






N[(t)] dFX(t) , with q FX(y)
The Lorenz and the concentration curves for net income differ in the order in
which observations of net incomes appear; for the Lorenz curve, N appears in
increasing values of itself, but for the concentration curve, N appears in
increasing values of its associated gross income.
Let the feeling of ill-performance of individual i comparing himself to
individual j be positive when i is overpassed by j and negative when i overpasses
j. Assume, moreover, that the intensity of the performance feeling is given by the












Nj ,i f p i <p j and qi >q j
N j ,i f p i >p j and qi <q j
0 , otherwise
Now integrate r
*(i,j) over the whole distribution of individuals j, for i
with post-tax position qi. We can check that this yields an average feeling r
*(qi)
of ill-performance for i such that










N X p dp
This average feeling of ill-performance for i may be positive or negative. If, for
instance, qi < G(qi) because i has been outranked by j in the tax and benefit
allocation, then, for a discrete distribution of H individuals,
4(6) r (qi) 1
H
Nj >0
If qi>G(qi) because the tax and benefit allocation has made i jump above k, then
(7) r (qi) 1
H
Nk <0
This negative feeling of ill-performance r
* indicates that i feels relatively favored
by the tax and benefit allocation. We can also have that qi=G(qi), with i
simultaneously overpassing k and being overpassed by j. The average feeling of
ill-performance of i would then be:
(8) r (qi) 1
H
Nj Nk >0
We can provide an alternative specification of ill-performance feeling










Nj ,i f q j <q i <p j
N j ,i f p j <q i <q j
0 , otherwise
That is, with r(i,j), i is assumed to monitor whether an individual j jumped
below or above i’s net income position. For a jump above i, r is positive, and
for a jump below, r is negative. We note that r(i,j) differs from r
*(i,j) in that
r
*(i,j) registers all rank changes involving i, whereas r(i,j) only reacts to rank
changes that influence the distribution of those with a net income greater than
that of i. For instance, if the only reranking disturbance were a jump of i above
k, r(i,j) would be zero for all j, but r
*(i,k) would be negative.
Let r(qi) be the average value of r(i, j) over the whole distribution of








N (q) dq N X(p) dp µN CN qi LN qi
his can be interpreted as a resentment index for the presence of some "newly
rich" in the group of individuals richer than i. This average feeling of resentment
r(qi) indicates by what amount the income of the richer class exceeds what the
income of the richer class would have been if no "new rich" had displaced "old
rich". r(qi) is always non-negative.
Atkinson (1979) and Plotnick (1981) proposed an index of horizontal
inequity, R, that equals twice the area between the Lorenz and the concentration
curves for net income. They note that CN(p)³LN(p) for all p, with strict inequality
somewhere if and only if there is reranking in moving from X to N. Using
equations (5) and (10), we can show that this index R is the average feeling of















We illustrate this with a simple example.
Example 1:
Let a mean-preserving transfer occur between i and j, with Xi<Xj and
Ni=Nj+a, a>0. Assume that no other individual is reranked. For a discrete
distribution, we then have that r(qj)=a/H and that r(qk)=0, "k¹j. With that rank-




6Although clearly horizontally inequitable, this transfer would reduce inequality
if and only if Ni <X jor, equivalently, if and only if a< Xj-Nj.
III. Generalised Gini Indices of Inequality and Feelings of
Deprivation
Let the relative deprivation felt by i with income X(pi), when comparing
himself with j with income X(pj), be given
8 by the difference X(pj)-X(pi)i fji s
richer than i. Otherwise, i feels no relative deprivation. For i comparing himself
with j, relative deprivation then equals:
(13) g pi,p j min 0, X pj X pi
The average feeling of deprivation felt by i over the whole population of
individuals j is:




g pi,p d p
Some manipulation shows that this can be rewritten as:
(15) c pi µX 1 LX pi X pi 1 pi
which is the gap between the total income of the richer than i and their total
income if they all had X(pi) instead. Averaging c(pi) over the whole population
and multiplying by (2/µX), we would obtain the Gini coefficient, as shown below.
We may, however, generalise this averaging process by applying an
ethically sensitive distributional weight to c(pi). We focus here on one such class
8 For a general discussion of this specification and of the interpretation of
k(p) later in this Section, see Lambert (1993), p. 123-129.
7of ethical weights
9, the class leading to a generalisation of the Gini coefficient
by Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and by Yitzhaki (1983)
10.
The probability that all incomes in a random and independent draw of
(v-1) incomes from F be larger than x is [1-F(x)]
v-1, with v>1. The distribution
function for a minimum income x in a random draw of (v-1) incomes is then 1-
[1-F(x)]
v-1, and the density of this minimum x in draws of (v-1) incomes then
becomes (v-1)•[1-F(x)]
(v-2). Increasing v increases the density of lower incomes
relative to the density of higher incomes. Let k(p)=(v-1)(1-p)
v-2 and define an






c pk pd p
G X (v) is thus a weighted average feeling of deprivation in the population. This
weighted average measures the expected deprivation feeling of the most deprived
individual in a random draw (from F) of (v-1) individuals. Through integration
by parts, we can show that (16) can be rewritten as




p LX pk pd p
which is the Generalised Gini coefficient of Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and
Yitzhaki (1983). Equation (17) also indicates that G(2) yields the standard Gini
coefficient, with k(p)º1. Thus, if and only if we give equal ethical weight to the
9 Other weights to the individual valuation of relative deprivation in Section
III and of relative performance in Section IV can be used if they are allowed by
the general linear class of inequality measures defined in Mehran (1976). Duclos
(1993) shows how that class generates a general class of horizontal inequity
indices. A different option for the computation of indices of inequality and
horizontal inequity would be to define increasing and convex functions of c(p)
and r(p), as suggested by Chakravarty and Chakraborty (1984). Berrebi and
Silber (1985) suggest how we may express a number of other inequality indices
as variously-defined functions of relative deprivation feelings.
10 See Donaldson and Weymark (1983) for the correspondence between the
continuous and the discrete versions of that generalisation of the Gini coefficient.
8feelings of relative deprivation c(p) of all individuals, do we find the standard
Gini coefficient.
The ethical weights k(p) in (16) and (17) vary with the parameter v. The
greater the value of v, the more emphasis is placed on the deprivation feelings
of the worst-off individuals since it is then more likely that they will emerge as





at which limit we become ethically insensitive towards inequality since we only
care about the relative deprivation feeling of the richest individual, which is zero.
When 1<v<2, in computing the mean feeling of deprivation over the population,
more weight is placed upon the individuals higher up in the income distribution.
As mentioned above, at v=2, equal weight is awarded to all feelings of
deprivation c(p). As v increases above 2, more and more relative weight is put













where the Generalised Gini coefficient of inequality equals the relative
deprivation felt by the most deprived individual in the distribution.
IV. Generalised Horizontal Inequity Indices
Now define:




q CN(q) k qd q
This is equivalent to the Generalised Gini coefficient GN(v) for the distribution
of net income N except for the feature that the concentration curve CN is used
for IN(v) instead of the Lorenz curve LN for GN(v). Subtracting IN(v) from GN(v),
we obtain a v-sensitive class of horizontal inequity indices:




CN q LN qk qd q






r qk qd q
which is simply v times the average feeling of ill-performance r(q), pondered by
the ethically sensitive distributional weights k(q), and normalised by mean
income. R(v) satisfies the three properties which Plotnick (1982) proposes as
desirable for an index of horizontal inequity, that is, the property of indepen-
dence from mean income, the property of anonymity, and the property by which
a reversal of initial ranks increases horizontal inequity.
R(v) generalises the Atkinson-Plotnick index of horizontal inequity,
which is given by R(2). In particular, R(2) attaches equal weight to the ill-
performance feeling of every individual in the population. This contradicts the
claim of Plotnick (1981,p.285) that his index "attaches greater weight to
inequities occurring among units with high preredistribution ranks than to those
affecting lower ranking units". We can interpret the role of v as an ethical




where the ethical focus is entirely upon the feeling of ill-performance of the
richest individual in the net income distribution, which is necessarily zero. The
greater the value of v, the more weight is granted to the feeling of ill-perfor-
mance of the poor in assessing horizontal inequity. For a discrete distribution, we
find that, as v tends to infinity, the index R(v) equals the feeling of relative ill-


















v( v1) 1 qj
v 2
The assessed importance of horizontal inequity then depends on a, the impor-
tance of the inequity, on qj , the rank of the outranked individual, and on the
ethical parameter v.
V. Illustration
We illustrate some of the above results through the use of the 1981 and
1990 Canadian Surveys of Consumer Finances. These surveys provide,
respectively, 37,779 and 45,461 observations on the distributions of earned and
unearned incomes, income taxes, cash transfers, and a number of household
characteristics. From this, we computed levels of family gross and net incomes;
net incomes include, inter alia, personal income taxes, child tax credits, old age
transfers and public pensions, and social assistance and unemployment insurance
benefits. We use the OECD equivalence scale to take into account the heteroge-
neity of family size and composition. Families with negative gross or net
incomes were removed from the samples. The asymptotic standard errors of the
relative ill-performance feelings at different points of the income distribution and
of the aggregate indices of total horizontal inequity were computed using the
recent statistical inference results of Davidson and Duclos (1995).
Table 1 shows the relative ill-performance feelings r(q), normalised by
mean incomes, for individuals at deciles 1 to 9 in the distributions of net
incomes in 1981 and in 1990. Ill-performance is highest at the first deciles, and
decreases continuously. Although this is not a necessary trend, it is not
unexpected since the density of incomes is higher around the lower deciles, and
it is also at these lower deciles that the benefit system is most operative. Ill-
performance feelings at the highest deciles must largely be caused by personal
income taxation, and the income density and reranking possibilities are also
11smaller at those higher income levels. Feelings of ill-performance range between
0.26% and 0.97% of average income in 1981, and exceed 1% of average income
for the first four deciles of 1990. These feelings are also significantly and
statistically higher in 1990 than in 1981, except for individuals at the ninth
decile.
Table 2 aggregates the feelings of relative ill-performance at different
points in the income distribution by applying the ethically-sensitive weights k(p)
of Section IV. The asymptotic standard errors of the resulting indices are also
shown in parentheses. In the light of the results of Table 1, it is not surprising
to find that, as the parameter v increases and as the ethical focus is shifted from
the feelings of relative ill-performance of the rich to those of the poor, the
aggregate indices of horizontal inequity increase, both in 1981 and in 1990. It is
also clear that horizontal inequity in 1990 is, statistically, significantly greater in
1990 than in 1981, regardless of the values of v shown in Table 3. Numerically,
horizontal equity is about 50% larger in 1990 than in 1981. At v=2, we have the
Atkinson-Plotnick index of horizontal inequity, which equals twice the average
feeling of ill-performance across the population. This average feeling is, again,
approximately 50% greater in 1990 than in 1981, and equals 0.51% and 0.74%
of average incomes in 1981 and 1990, respectively.
VI. Conclusion
We assume that individuals assess their relative performance in the
state’s tax and benefit allocation by observing those by whom they are
overpassed and those they succeed in outranking in the income distribution. We
measure the intensity of these relative performance feelings by the incomes of
those individuals against whom performance is compared. A class of horizontal
inequity indices is then defined as an ethically sensitive function of average ill-
performance feelings. We show that a well-known member of that class is the
Atkinson-Plotnick index of horizontal inequity. This also helps interpret and
understand the popular reranking approach to measuring horizontal inequity.
12Generalised Gini coefficients are analogously found to be ethically sensitive
functions of individual feelings of deprivation, when deprivation is appraised
relative to what others have in the income distribution. In assessing the
population’s overall feeling of ill-performance and relative deprivation, we can
increase the value of the parameter v to shift the ethical focus from greater
weight onto the better off, to equal weight onto all individuals, to greater weight
onto the worst off. An illustration using Canadian data indicates that horizontal
inequity has increased significantly between 1981 and 1990, and that the intensity
of relative ill-performance feelings decreases as we move from the bottom to the
top deciles of the Canadian income distribution.
13VII. Appendix: Relative Performance and Horizontal Equity
with Discrete Distributions
Let a discrete income distribution contain H individuals, with finite and
non-negative incomes. A class of Generalised Gini (or S-Gini, for Single-


























be seen that (26) is the discrete analogue of








If the distribution function is a step function, the two specifications are identical.






LX(p) d v 1 p
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The second line of (28) is identical to the definition of the continuous distribu-
tion Generalised Gini coefficient in (17). The first line of (28) suggests that an






























where LXi is the Lorenz curve ordinate at quantile Xi for a discrete distribution.
14The tax and benefit system gives net incomes Ni as a function of Xi,
yielding the couples (Xi,Ni) such that if i<j, it must be that Xi£Xj. The
distribution of net incomes can also be ranked, yielding an ordered distribution
N[i] such that N[1]£N[2]£...£N[H]. Consider then the v-sensitive class of horizontal
inequity indices for discrete distributions, defined analogously to the continuous






























where CNi and LNi are the concentration and Lorenz curves ordinates at quantiles
Ni and N[i], respectively. We note that this is simply the discrete analogue of the
weighted average feeling of ill-performance r(i,j) [defined in (10)] over all i and
all j, normalised by average net incomes.









































is the sum of the incomes of those who should have been ahead of the individual
with post-tax and benefit rank i. Since there is a one-to-one correspondence

























which is simply twice the average feeling of relative ill-performance r
*(i,j)
[defined in (4)] over all j and over all i, normalised by mean income.
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19Table 1
Feelings of Relative Ill-Performance at Different Deciles
Canadian Tax and Benefit Systems, 1981 and 1990
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)
q 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
r(q) in 1981 0.0097 0.0074 0.0066 0.0063 0.0056 0.0053 0.0044 0.0038 0.0026
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
r(q) in 1990 0.0129 0.0117 0.0110 0.0109 0.0098 0.0088 0.0066 0.0050 0.0026
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003)
20Table 2
Aggregate Indices of Horizontal Inequity
Canadian Tax and Benefit Systems, 1981 and 1990
(asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)




0.0024 0.0046 0.0067 0.0086 0.0103 0.0120 0.0136 0.0152 0.016 0.0182




0.0035 0.0069 0.0101 0.0130 0.0159 0.0186 0.0211 0.0236 0.025 0.0282
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0013)
21